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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
APPELLATE BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
v. : 
MARKFIXMER, : 
Ct. App. No. 20010241-CA 
Defendant/Appellee. : Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review cases such as this where the 
magistrate dismissed counts because the state failed to present sufficient evidence for a bindover. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(1999 Replacement). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the state present a sufficient quantum of evidence to support a bindover for trial? 
This court reviews a magistrate's bindover decision as a question of law without deference to 
court's decision below. State v. Clark, 20 P.3d 300 (Utah 2001). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37d-4(b) and 58-37d-5(l)(a)(c)(d)(f) and (g). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The state filed separate informations against five people See State v. Kelson, Case No 
001600172, State v. Fixmer, Case No 001600173, State v. Hoppe, 001600174, State v. 
Guertzgen, Case No 001600175, State v. McLaughlan, Case No 001600176 Hoppe, Kelson 
and McLaughlin were arrested at a separate location from Fixmer and Guertzgen, although each 
was charged with similar offenses After the preliminary hearing, the court dismissed the 
clandestine laboratory charges against Kelson and Hoppe The state filed petitions for 
interlocutory review on the Kelson and Hoppe cases, McLaughlin's case was not appealed The 
Utah Supreme Court "remanded the [Kelson and Hoppe] cases to the Court of Appeals with 
instructions to reverse the magistrate's order quashing the bindover against both defendants, and 
binding both defendants over on the first degree felony charges " See Notice Case Nos 
20010149 & 20010151 
Mr Fixmer's case was dismissed and the state sought review of that dismissal order (The 
Dismissal Order is attached as Addendum "A") At the time the appeal was filed, the Utah Court 
of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear this matter Utah Code Ann §78-2a-3(2)(e)(1999 
Replacement)l Despite the state's repeated attempts to consolidate Mr Fixmer's case with the 
Kelson and Hoppe cases,2 and requests for summary reversal, the court of appeals denied those 
motions ruling that Mr Fixmer's case "is factually distinguishable from the companion cases 
" See Order Denying Summary Reversal (attached as Addendum "C") 
1
 The jurisdiction statute was amended after the notice of appeal was filed in this case 
The Utah Supreme Court now has original jurisdiction over the dismissal of first degree felonies 
2
 Appellee's Objection to Motion for Summary Reversal is attached as Addendum "B" 
2 
Appellee argued that there was insufficient evidence that Mr. Fixmer constructively 
possessed drug paraphernalia and stolen property, and there was no evidence that he intended to 
operate a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory. That was because Mr. Fixmer neither 
possessed drugs nor precursor chemicals. Moreover, he argued that being "duped" into storing 
lab equipment and even knowing that lab equipment was in the garage, as argued by the state, was 
insufficient evidence to support the bindover. See Objection to Motion for Summary Reversal. 
This court agreed with appellee, refused to summarily reverse the magistrate, and ordered the 
parties to brief the issues. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The state failed to present sufficient evidence to support a bindover of the charges against 
Mr. Fixmer. He did not possess laboratory equipment or supplies and had no intent to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operation. Moreover, there was insufficient evidence that he received, 
retained, or disposed of property of another with the intent to permanently deprive or that he 
possessed drug paraphernalia. The magistrate properly applied the probable cause standard 
outline by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Clark, 20 P. 3d 300 (Utah 2001) in refusing to 
bindover this case. Appellee asks this court to uphold the magistrate's decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 11, 2000, at approximately 3:00 to 3:30 a.m., Summit County Deputies 
Mike Grant and Milton Cox were patrolling "the area of Silver Summit and Trailside Park." Trial 
Record, 91 (hereinafter "R"). The deputies observed "a pickup pulling a trailer being followed by 
two four-wheelers." R. 91. Robert McLaughlin was driving one of the four-wheelers, R. 92, 
Amanda Kelson was driving the other, while Karl Hoppe was driving the pickup truck. R. 96. 
3 
McLaughlin was arrested for DUI. R. 93-94. While being handcuffed, McLaughlin threw a small 
container with methamphetamine into the weeds by the side of the road. R. 94. 
The closest residence to the pickup truck and four-wheelers was 100 to 150 feet away. R 
95. While questioning McLaughlin, police noticed that Kelson5 s four-wheeler and the trailer 
attached to the pickup lacked registration stickers. R. 96. They also learned that Hoppe's license 
was suspended. R. 96. The police conducted impound searches of the truck and four-wheelers, 
R. 97, finding plastic coolers and tarps tied to the back of the four-wheelers. R. 97. Upon 
opening the coolers, police found chemicals and other items thought to be consistent with a umeth 
lab." R 97, 148. 
The chemicals found inside the coolers included hydrochloric acid, pseudoephedrine, and 
iodine.3 See Exhibits 1, 31 and 25-30. Drug Enforcement Agent Shannon Carrizal testified that 
these items are "typically found when investigating or processing a clandestine meth lab." R. 157. 
Carrizal also stated that the PH testing kits, the two burner Coleman stove, round bottom flasks, 
condenser columns, and rubber hoses, found with the chemicals on the four-wheelers, were items 
used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. R. 157-58. A vent bag which is a device "used for 
trapping phosphene gas during methamphetamine production . . . ," was also found on a four-
wheeler. R. 158, Exhibit 26. 
After searching the four-wheelers and arresting Hoppe, McLaughlin and Kelson, police 
obtained a warrant to search the residence at 747 Richmond Drive. R 97. That residence was 
located "a couple hundred yards down the road . . ." from the location of the four-wheelers. R. 
3
 Iodine and pseudoephedrine are precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of 
methamphetamine. 
4 
112. Police arrived at the home at 10:30 a.m., R. 98, 113, and found Page Geurtzgen and Mark 
Fixmer inside. R. 114. Mr. Fixmer was in bed, R. 114, Mr. Geurtzgen answered the door. R. 
107. 
Police seized a number of items from the home. See Exhibits 1 & 2, Items #1 through #9; 
Exhibits 3 through 24. The items found in the home on the inventory list are identified as follows: 
Item Number Item Description 
1 Pressure cooker w/ unknown liquid 
substance, approx 600 ml 
1 a Sample of Exhibit # 1 
2 Glass container (450 ml) w/unk liquid 
2a Sample of Exhibit #2 
3 Glass pipe with unknown white 
powder substance 
3a Sample of #3 
4 2 white filters with white powder substance 
4a Sample #4 
5 Spoon and plastic straws w/ white residue 
6 Ladle w/ white powdered substance 
6a Sample #6 
7 Metal box with paraphernalia (glass 
pipe/zig zags/forceps/glass bottles) 
8 2 rubber hoses 
9 Fingerprint from Exhibit #2 
5 
State's Exhibit 2.4 
The samples from the items identified above, items la, 2a, 3a, 4a, and 6a, were taken to 
the Utah State Crime Laboratory for testing to determine if those items were "from a meth lab." 
See State's Exhibit 31. No controlled substances or precursor chemicals used in the manufacture 
of methamphetamine were found in any of the items taken from the house. States's Exhibit 31. 
In fact, the state's attorney dismissed the possession count against Mr. Fixmer "based on the fact 
that there was no positive lab result for controlled substance." R. 186. The police also found no 
comparable finger prints of Mr. Fixmer's on any of the glassware seized from the four-wheelers, 
see State's Exhibit 33, or on the items fingerprinted in the garage. R. 152, States's Exhibit 33. 
While first responding officer Grant thought some of the items in the home might be drug 
paraphernalia, R. 104, he acknowledged that police often have suspected paraphernalia or lab 
equipment tested at the crime lab for the presence of controlled substances or precursors . R. 115. 
Grant saw nothing resembling a meth lab, R. 115, found no precursor chemicals associated with 
the manufacture of methamphetamine in the home, R.116, and discovered no drug or precursor 
residue on any of the seized items. See State's Exhibit, 31. 
Agent Craig Hicken, who works for the Utah Criminal Investigation Unit, in noting a 
shade over the garage window at 747 Richmond Avenue, stated, "it's common for persons who 
have laboratories to shade their windows . . . ." R. 136. See also State's Exhibit 13. He also 
thought that common garden hose, found in the garage, could be used "in one of the processes of 
producing methamphetamine," R. 137, State's Exhibit 22, and that the flat bottom flask, found in 
the garage next to the power steering fluid, could be used "in the methamphetamine production." 
4
 The other items identified in State's Exhibit 2 were found on the four-wheelers. 
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R 137 Although he could not identify yellow stains found in the garage, R 138, State's Exhibit 
20, he nonetheless testified that he typically sees "yellowish type stains in a methamphetamine 
lab " R 139 Finally he told the court that the Coleman propane fuel cannister, found in the 
kitchen, is also "used sometimes in the production " of methamphetamine R 139, State's 
Exhibit 6 
When Hicken entered the home at 747 Richmond, he wore a phosphene gas detector R 
144 Phosphene is an airborne residual gas associated with the production of methamphetamine 
R 145 Hicken neither observed evidence of phosphene gas nor detected it with his scientific 
equipment R 144-45 He also did not test the vent bag found on the four-wheeler for the 
presence of phosphene, R 148, as the purpose of the bag "is not to allow the gas to escape " R 
153 
Hicken acknowledged that the garden hose depicted in State's Exhibit 22, could be 
purchased in any hardware store R 145 More importantly, chemicals would have to travel 
through the hoses as part of methamphetamine production process, but in this case, "[tjhere was 
no residue noted on the hoses [and] [t]hey were not tested " R 145 Finally, he found no 
"chemicals associated with the production of methamphetamine in the flask [or] in the yellow 
stains " found on the floor R 146 
Drug Enforcement Administration Agent (DEA) Shannon Carrizal assisted with 
processing the evidence in this case R 155 He testified that the flat bottom flask found on the 
garage shelf could be used in the methamphetamine production process R 160 He felt that the 
hosing, and cotton balls found in the house could also be used as part of a methamphetamine 
production process R 160-61 Carrizal stated that if the flat bottom flask was used to produce 
7 
methamphetamine, the crime lab would be able to detect chemicals associated with that 
production process, R. 163, but no such chemicals were detected here. State's Exhibit 31. 
Summit County Sheriff Detective Brad Wilde interviewed Mark Fixmer on the date the 
search warrant was executed. That interview was tape recorded, but police lost the tape before 
the preliminary hearing. R. 54. Nonetheless, Wilde testified that: 
Mark [Fixmer] said that he didn't really know Karl [Hoppe] that much, and John 
[McLaughlin] for that matter, that they was Page's [Geurtzgen] friends, I believe is the 
word he used. [Fixmer] indicated that some time around the 4th of July Karl had brought 
up two four-wheelers, that I believe he said something to the affect(sic) that he, asked if 
he could leave the four-wheelers at Mark's house, and that the four-wheelers wasn't 
registered, and that he didn't want cem to ride cem. 
R. 177. 
Mr. Fixmer admitted riding the four-wheelers a few times during the summer. R. 177 
Later on during the summer Hoppe brought items to the house represented to be camping 
equipment which he asked to store in the corner of the garage. R. 178. 
At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, Mr. Fixmer argued that the state failed to 
present sufficient evidence to support a bindover. The court agreed and dismissed the case. 
L THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT A SUFFICIENT QUANTUM OF 
EVIDENCE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT MR. FIXMER POSSESSED 
LABORATORY EQUIPMENT WITH INTENT TO ENGAGE IN A 
CLANDESTINE LAB OPERATION OR THAT HE WAS A PARTY TO 
RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY OR THAT HE POSSESSED DRUG 
PARAPHERNALIA 
A. Summary of Argument 
Appellee will explain below the standards that a magistrate must follow in evaluating a 
case like this when the state seeks to show constructive possession. The argument begins with a 
review of the probable cause standard at preliminary hearings. The second part explains 
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constructive possession case law and its application here. The succeeding section provides an 
overview of reasonable suspicion/probable cause case law which is applicable to this court's 
analysis in light of the probable cause standard set forth in State v. Clark, 20 P.3d 300 (Utah 
2001). Finally, Appellee will demonstrate why the magistrate correctly applied the proper 
standard in dismissing this case. 
B. Bindover Standard 
The Utah Supreme Court recently defined the probable cause standard for a preliminary 
hearing: 
To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must show 'probable cause' at a preliminary 
hearing by 'presenting sufficient evidence to establish that the 'crime charged has been 
committed and that the defendant has committed it.' At this stage of the proceeding, 'the 
evidence required to show probable cause is relatively low because the assumption is that 
the prosecution's case will only get stronger as the investigation continues. Accordingly, 
'when faced with conflicting evidence, the magistrate may not sift or weigh evidence but 
must leave those tasks 'to the finder of fact at trial.' Instead, 'the magistrate must view all 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the prosecution. 
State v. Clark, 20 P.3d 300, 303 (Utah 2001) (citations omitted). 
The Supreme Court further clarified the standard by holding that the "quantum of 
evidence necessary to support a bindover is less than that necessary to survive a directed verdict 
motion." Clark, 20 P.3d at 305. The court analogized the preliminary hearing standard to the 
arrest warrant probable cause standard, id., noting, however, as a practical matter, that the state 
still has a "higher bar" at a preliminary hearing because an accused has the right to cross-examine 
witnesses and present evidence, two rights which are unavailable in the ex parte issuance of an 
arrest warrant. Id. n. 3. The court nonetheless emphasized the magistrate's gatekeeping function 
"to ensure that all 'groundless and improvident prosecutions' are ferreted out no later than the 
9 
preliminary hearing . . .," observing that the magistrate "is no t . . . a rubber stamp for the 
prosecution." Ttf. at 303 (quoting State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783-84 (Utah 1980)). 
C. Constructive Possession 
"In order to prove constructive possession, there must be a nexus between the accused 
and the drug sufficient enough to allow an inference that the accused had both the ability and the 
intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug." State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 
(Utah App. 1991); State v. Reed, Case No. 99093-CA (Utah App. 2000) (unpublished opinion) 
(defendant who lived in a home for three weeks before discovery of controlled substance 
precursors and laboratory equipment is insufficient to demonstrate constructive possession).5 
Utah courts have repeatedly held that mere presence at a location where illegal drugs are found is 
insufficient to establish a nexus between the defendant and the drug. Id.; see State v. Layman, 
985 P.2d 911 (Utah 1999)(evidence insufficient to show that defendant constructively possessed 
drugs and paraphernalia found inside passenger's pouch during traffic stop); State v. Fox, 709 
P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985) ("knowledge and ability to possess do equal possession where there is 
no evidence of intent to make use of that knowledge and ability." ); Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 
975 P.2d 501 (Utah App. 1999) (knowledge of purported drug paraphernalia found in home that 
accused shared with another, is insufficient without more, to support conviction). 
In evaluating constructive possession, the courts consider the facts of each case mindful 
that the ultimate test is whether there is a sufficient nexus between the accused and the drugs or 
paraphernalia to permit a factual inference that the accused "had the power and intent to exercise 
control over the drugs and paraphernalia." Layman, 985 P.2d at 914. Although there is no 
5
 This opinion is attached as Addendum "D" 
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specific check list of factors, Utah courts consider things like incriminating statements, suspicious 
or incriminating behavior, sale of drugs, use of drugs, proximity of the accused to location of 
drugs, drugs in plain view, and drugs on the accused's person, Solas, 820 P.2d at 1388, and 
evidence that the accused was participating with others in the mutual use and enjoyment of the 
contraband or drugs. Bryan, 975 P.2d at 503. 
D. Mere Presence is Insufficient to Support Bindover 
Mere presence at the scene of a crime without more is insufficient to support a reasonable 
suspicion to stop and detain, and is clearly insufficient to support a level III encounter, the 
standard most closely applicable to support a bindover. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 61 L.Ed. 
2d (1979) (mere presence of person in a neighborhood frequented by drug users does not give rise 
to reasonable suspicion that such person is involved in criminal activity); State v. Parker, 834 P.2d 
592, 595 (Utah App. 1992)("presence at or near the scene of a crime, without more, does not 
give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity"); State v. Sykes, 840 P.2d 825 (Utah App. 
1992) (accused's mere presence at house suspected of drug activity does not give rise to 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity); State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 13 (Utah App. 1991) ("A 
'persons mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without 
more, give rise to probable cause to search that person."). 
E. The Magistrate Applied the Proper Standard in Not Binding This Matter Over for Trial 
In this case, the state charged Mr. Fixmer with four offenses: I. Unlawful Possession of 
Methamphetamine Laboratory Equipment or Supplies, a first degree felony in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(b) and 58-37d-5(l)(a)(c)(d)(f) and (g); II. Receiving Stolen Property, 
originally charged as a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408, but 
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reduced to a class B misdemeanor at the preliminary hearing6; III. Possession of 
Methamphetamine, a third degree felony in violation Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), which 
was dismissed by state motion at the preliminary hearing;7 and IV. Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5. 
To support a bindover, the state must present "sufficient evidence to support a reasonable 
belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it." Clark, 20 P.2d at 
305. That means to support count I, the methamphetamine laboratory charge, the state must 
present evidence that: 
1. Mr. Fixmer knowingly and intelligently; 
2. Possessed laboratory equipment or supplies; 
3. With the intent to engage in a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory operation; and 
4. That the offense involved: 
(a) possession of one or more firearms; 
(b) the illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of hazardous or dangerous 
material or while transporting or causing to be transported materials in furtherance 
of clandestine laboratory operation, there was created a substantial risk to human 
health, safety, or danger to the environment; 
(c) said intended laboratory operation was to take or did take place within 500 feet 
or a residence, place of business, church, or school; 
(d) said clandestine laboratory operation actually produced any amount of a 
specified controlled substance; or 
(e) the intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of a 
methamphetamine base. 
See Information, Count I. 
Count II requires the state to present a sufficient quantum of evidence to show: 
1. Mr. Fixmer received, retained, or disposed of property of another; 
2. Knowing said property had been stolen with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
6
 The state does not appeal the reduction from a second degree felony to a class B 
misdemeanor. 
7
 This count is also not part of the appeal. 
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Count III, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, requires proof that: 
1. Mr. Fixmer used or possessed with intent to use; 
2. Drug paraphernalia; 
3. To plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, 
produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, ingest, inhale, or 
otherwise introduce a controlled substance in the human body. 
Here, the state failed to present "sufficient evidence" to support the bindover. The state 
presented no evidence that Mr .Fixmer knowingly or intelligently possessed laboratory equipment 
or precursor chemicals. There were no precursor chemicals or methamphetamine found in the 
home8 and the three experienced drug agents all stated that they observed no methamphetamine or 
lab in the house. R. 115-16, R.66, R.85. When applying the factors identified in constructive 
possession cases, it is clear that Mr. Fixmer neither sold drugs nor possessed drugs, was not 
found to be using illegal drugs, and no drugs were found on his person, Salas, 820 P.2d at 1388. 
The closest drugs were found over 200 yards away on the persons of Kelson and McLaughlin, 
and there is no suggestion that he participated in the mutual use and enjoyment of the drugs with 
them. See Layman, 985 P.2d at 914 (a defendant cannot be found in constructive possession of 
drugs found on another person unless the state can prove he had the power and intent to exercise 
control over the drugs); see also Bryan, 975 P.2d at 503. 
An additional important factor in the court's bindover decision was that Mr. Fixmer was 
not the sole occupant of the home. See Fox, 709 P.2d at 320 (occupancy of home containing 
illegal drugs is insufficient to support conviction unless state can show intent to exercise dominion 
and control over drugs); Reed, Case No. 990973 (court of appeals upholds Magistrate's decision 
8
 The state dismissed the controlled substance charge when the state laboratory reported 
no controlled substances or precursor chemicals were found in the house. 
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to dismiss case finding that Reed's occupancy of home with others was insufficient to show 
constructive possession of meth lab). Here, Page Guertzgen, who also occupied the home, 
answered the door when police knocked, and was closely associated with Hoppe and 
McLaughlin, the two found in actual possession of the lab equipment. Interestingly, Guertzgen 
fled the jurisdiction after his arrest, a fact suggesting consciousness of guilt. See State v. Bales, 
675 P.2d 573 (Utah 1983). Moreover, Mr. Fixmer told police that any items left in the garage 
were put there by Guertzgen's friends. R. 177. He denied ownership of any of the seized items. 
There was additionally no evidence that Mr. Fixmer exercised dominion and control over 
any of the items found on the four-wheelers. He barely knew the people in actual possession of 
the lab equipment, who were instead friends of the other tenant, Page Guertzgen. R. 177. Mr. 
Fixmer never observed the items left in the garage, believing that anything left in the garage by 
Hoppe was camping equipment.9 Even if Mr. Fixmer knew that the items were lab equipment, the 
state still failed to show that he intended to exercise dominion and control over those items. Fox, 
P.2d at 321 (A person's knowledge of the presence of illegal dmgs in his home is not illegal if the 
person did not exercise dominion and control over the drugs). 
Similarly, there was no evidence to show that Mr. Fixmer had direct or exclusive control 
over the garage area or over any other purported paraphernalia items found in the home. See 
Fox, 709 P.2d at 321; Reed, (court appropriately upheld dismissal when there was no evidence 
that accused had control over room where laboratory was found). Indeed, it is questionable 
whether any of the items here are paraphernalia since neither drugs, drug residue, nor precursor 
9
 As demonstrated in State's Exhibits 27-30 and by officer Grant's testimony, the lab 
materials were sealed in closed containers and not in plain view R. 19 
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chemicals were found in the home or on any of the seized items. In any event, no witness testified 
that Mr. Fixmer exercised dominion and control over the items, and there was certainly no 
evidence that Mr. Fixmer constructively possessed the items on the four-wheelers. See Laymen, 
985 P.2d at 1389. 
In addition to the intent element, the state must also present evidence that the items 
possessed by Mr. Fixmer were part of a methamphetamine lab. The unidentified yellow stains, 
shaded windows, common garden hose, and cotton balls were not part of a meth lab here, since 
each officer testified that chemical residue would normally be found on the items if used in a 
clandestine lab. Here, nothing suggesting an operational lab was found. The beaker found on the 
garage shelf, which police said could be used to manufacture methamphetamine, was extensively 
tested by a toxicologist at the state crime laboratory. There were neither controlled substances 
nor precursors found on the beaker or in the liquid inside. State's Exhibit 31. Moreover, there 
were no precursor chemicals found near the beaker, and nothing to suggest that Mr. Fixmer 
exercised control over the beaker. In short the state also failed in its burden on the second 
element as there was no lab equipment in the home. 
Even if Mr. Fixmer knew about the items on the four-wheelers, there still is no evidence 
that he "intended to engage in a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory operation." See Fox, 
709 P.2d at 321. The state makes two arguments in its brief: (1) "that [Mr. Fixmer] had been 
duped into storing the meth lab equipment and supplies, stolen four-wheelers, and drug 
paraphernalia inside his home and garage, or (2) that [Mr. Fixmer] knew the meth lab equipment 
and supplies, stolen four-wheelers and drug paraphernalia in his home and garage were 
contraband." Under either theory, the state has failed to present sufficient evidence to support a 
15 
bindover. Being "duped" into storing meth lab equipment shows no intent to engage in a lab 
operation. See Fox, 709 P.2d at 321; Reed, Case No. 990973. The state has accordingly failed 
to meet its burden on this crucial element of the case. Similarly, simple knowledge of meth lab 
equipment is equally insufficient to show an intent to manufacture. See Fox, 709 P.2d at 321. 
Moreover, knowledge that illegal items are in a home is not against the law unless the state can 
demonstrate an accused's intent to exercise dominion and control over the items. Here, the state 
by its own admission, concedes that the evidence is insufficient on this element, even considering 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the state. 
Mr. Fixmer's proximity to the other defendant's is likewise an insufficient basis to support 
a bindover. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 61 L.ED. 2d (1979) (mere presence of person in a 
neighborhood frequented by drug users does not give rise to reasonable suspicion that such 
person is involved in criminal activity); State v. Parker, 834 P.2d 592, 595 (Utah App. 
1992)("presence at or near the scene of a crime, without more, does not give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity"); State v. Sykes, 840 P.2d 825 (Utah App. 1992) (Accused's mere 
presence at house suspected of drug activity does not give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity); State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 13 (Utah App. 1991) ("A 'persons mere propinquity to 
others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable 
cause to search that person."). Here, Kelson, Hoppe, and McLaughlin were found over 200 yards 
away from the home and there is no evidence they spoke with Mr. Fixmer on the day the parties 
were arrested. Simply being near these people or even knowing they possessed drugs or lab 
equipment is an insufficient basis to support a bindover. See e.g., Munsen, 821 P.2d at 14. 
The arguments above apply equally to count II, possession of drug paraphernalia, and 
16 
count IV, possession of stolen property. First, there is no evidence that Mr. Fixmer knew the 
four-wheelers were stolen. While he consented to allowing the storage of these vehicles in his 
garage, he did not know that they were stolen. Likewise, if he was "duped" into storing the four-
wheelers, as argued by the state, there can be no crime because there is no knowledge that the 
vehicles were stolen. 
Moreover, as argued above, the items found in the house were not used as drug 
paraphernalia. Each item can be legally bought and possessed, no one stated that Mr. Fixmer 
exercised dominion and control over the items, and no illegal drugs were found on or near the 
paraphernalia. The state likewise failed to prove possession of drug paraphernalia. 
CONCLUSION 
In considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, consistent with 
the probable cause standard set forth in Clark, the magistrate did not err in refusing to bindover 
the three remaining counts against Mr. Fixmer. There is insufficient evidence that he knowingly 
or intentionally possessed laboratory equipment, stolen four-wheelers, and drug paraphernalia. 
Additionally, they failed to show, even assuming Mr. Fixmer knew the lab equipment was 
temporarily stored in the garage, that he intended to participate in a clandestine methamphetamine 
operation. 
Mr. Fixmer asks this court to uphold the Magistrate's order of dismissal. 
DATED this day ofJune, 2002. 
ICHARD P. MAURO 
Attorney for Appellee Mark Fixmer 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing APPELLATE BRIEF was mailed, postage pre-
paid, to the following, this / / day of June, 2002 
Assistant Attorney General Marian Decker 
160 East 300 South 6th Floor 
P O Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
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ADDENDUM 
"A" 
No. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT F I L E D 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH •„,,„, „„,.,,„., 
' 1 n$ra utstnut Court / A 
By ^ ^ J p r 
FEB 2 3 2001 
rhird DMriut Cou 
Deputy Clerk, SurnrnfTcounr 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, RULING 
vs. 
ROBERT J. McLAUGHLAN, Case No. 001600176 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
MARKFIXMER, Case No. 001600173 
Defendant. Judge Robert K. Hilder 
Preliminary hearing was held on the above two cases, and two other companion cases, on 
January 16, 2001. Following receipt of evidence and argument, the court took the matter under 
advisement as to the above two defendants to consider the applicable law. Based on the 
stipulation of counsel, the court at this time defers ruling on the bindover of defendant Robert 
McLaughlan, but as to defendant Mark Fixmer, the court rules as follows: 
The court notes that Count III as to defendant Fixmer was dismissed on the State's 
motion at the hearing. The court now DISMISSES the remaining counts. The court is very 
aware of the probable cause standard for preliminary hearings, which standard was re-articulated 
and clarified by the Utah Supreme Court on February 6, 2001, after this matter was heard. State 
of Utah v. John Lamar Clark and Cory Howard Smith (consolidated cases for appeal), slip op., 
case numbers 990368 and 990798. The standard there set forth clearly applies to this case. 
Justice Durrant expressly adopted the reasonable belief standard of probable cause that applies to 
arrests. 
Applying that standard here, the court recognizes that it heard credible evidence, meeting 
the reasonable belief standard, that materials that may be used in a methamphetamine laboratory 
were present in the home in which Mr. Fixer resided; that drug paraphernalia was in the same 
residence; and that stolen ATV's had been stored at that residence until earlier the evening in 
question. 
There was no evidence of actual possession of methamphetamine laboratory supplies or 
drug paraphernalia by Mr. Fixmer, and no evidence that Mr. Fixmer actually received or retained 
the ATV's. Accordingly, the crux of plaintiff s case is constructive possession. As to each 
remaining count, what is lacking is any credible evidence of a nexus between Mr. Fixmer and the 
items in question. The case law provided by defendant clearly sets forth what is required to 
establish the critical nexus. That evidence was not adduced at the preliminary hearing. 
This Ruling will be the Order of Dismissal and no further order is required. 
By the Cc 
ftobett K.^ildej^DistncTCourt Judge 
f§? SUMMIT \o1j 
5 1 : 
V 0?—"'f / 
003*7 
ADDENDUM 
RICHARD P. MAURO (5402) 
43 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)363-9500 
Attorney for Appellee, Mark Fixmer 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY REVERSAL 
PlaintiffiAppellant, : 
v. : 
Dist. Ct. Case No. 001600173FS 
MARK FIXMER, : Ct. App. No. 20010241 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Appellee, Mark Fixmer, through his attorney, Richard P. Mauro, hereby files the following 
objection, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 10(c), to appellant's motion for summary reversal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In its motion for summary reversal, the state argues that the Utah Supreme Court's action 
in two separate cases, involving separate defendants, should be a basis for a summary reversal of 
the magistrate judge's action in failing to issue a bindover order in Mr. Fixmer's case.1 
Mr. Fixmer was charged in a separate information, with a different case number from Karl 
Hoppe and Amanda Kelson. He was charged with Possession of Methamphetamine Laboratory 
Equipment, a first degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(b); Receiving Stolen 
1
 The other cases, State v. Kelson, Case no. 20010524SC and State v. Hoppe, Case No. 
20010523, were remanded to the magistrate court by the Utah Supreme Court for trial on a 
methamphetamine laboratory charge. The Kelson and Hoppe cases were initially the subject of a 
petition for an interlocutory appeal to this court and later petition for certiorari to the Utah 
Supreme Court. Mr. Fixmer's case reached this court on direct appeal. 
Property, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408,2 Possession of 
Controlled Substance, to wit: methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i),3 and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B Misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5. 
On September 11, 2000, at approximately 3:30 p.m., two Summit County deputies 
observed three suspicious vehicles around the Silver Summit area of Park City, Utah. The 
deputies noticed a 1991 red and silver Dodge pick-up truck pajked on the side of the road. Karl 
Hoppe was in the driver's seat. They also observed two off-highway vehicles (hereinafter 
"OHV"), one driven by Amanda Kelson, the other by Robert McLaughlan. The deputies 
contacted McLaughlin, who they believed was under the influence of a controlled substance. 
When confronted, McLaughlin threw an object to the ground which police later determined was 
methamphetamine. 
A cooler was attached to the back of McLaughlin OHV. Inside the cooler, deputies 
discovered chemicals and equipment they thought might be used to manufacture 
methamphetamine. The police found a second cooler on the other OHV and arrested the driver, 
Ms. Kelson. In a search incident to arrest, police discovered a small quantity of 
methamphetamine on Ms. Kelson's person. The police also arrested Karl Hoppe, the driver of the 
pick-up truck. All three were charged with possession of mtethamphetamine laboratory 
2
 The state conceded at the preliminary hearing, that because an all terrain vehicle is not a 
motor vehicle, the most serious offense facing Mr. Fixmer is a class B misdemeanor theft offense. 
3
 The state moved to dismiss this charge at the preliminary hearing upon receipt of reports 
from the state crime laboratory showing that no controlled substances or precursors were located 
in Mr. Fixmer's home. 
2 
equipment, various traffic offenses and other drug charges. 
The deputies learned that the trio picked up the OHV's at 747 Richmond Avenue in Park 
City, Utah. Mark Fixmer and Page Guertzgen lived at the residence. Deputy Mike Grant 
obtained a search warrant to search that residence. Upon entering the house, deputies found 
Mark Fixmer "lying in bed," and Page Guertzgen in the living room. Guertzgen told police that 
everything they were looking for was in the garage. Later that morning, Mr. Fixmer was 
interviewed by Deputy Wilde.4 He told the deputy that Karl Hoppe and John McLaughlin were 
Page Guertzgen's friends. He also told police that Karl Hoppe brought two four-wheelers to the 
house around July 4, 2000, and asked for permission to store them in the garage. Hoppe later 
brought additional items to the house for storage that he represented to Fixmer to be camping 
equipment. 
Police discovered no controlled substances, no chemical precursors used to manufacture 
methamphetamine, and no items intended for the manufacture of methamphetamine in the home. 
They did discovered a glass pipe and unidentified white powder, but subsequent laboratory tests 
revealed neither controlled substances nor precursor chemicals. (Copies of the inventory list and 
laboratory reports are attached as Addendum "A"). 
Despite the absence of drugs and precursor chemicals, the state nonetheless claims 
"suspicious stains on the floor of garage . . ." are somehow evidence of illegal conduct and the 
matter should be bound.5 While one of the officers claimed to smell a chemical odor, he neither 
4
 That interviewed was tape-recorded by police. Unfortunately, either the police or the 
prosecuting agency have lost or destroyed the tape. 
5
 Common sense would suggest that virtually every garage has stains on the floor 
consistent with leaking oil, vehicle coolant, and automobile transmission fluid and other 
identified the smell nor linked the smell to illegal activity. In any event, the Utah crime laboratory 
found that none of the suspected items contained controlled substances or precursor chemicals. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT AT PRELIMINARY HEARING 
At the preliminary hearing, Mr. Fixmer argued that the state failed to present sufficient 
evidence to show that Mr. Fixmer constructively possessed laboratory materials with the intent to 
engage in a clandestine laboratory. Mr. Fixmer simply asked the court to apply established Utah 
appellate court precedents, which support his argument that he committed no crime. Those cases 
define constructive possession and support the magistrate's decision to dismiss. See e.g., State v. 
Reed, Case No. 990973 (Utah App. 2000) (A copy of the court's decision is attached as 
Addendum "B"). 
In the Reed case, the magistrate dismissed the possession of laboratory materials with 
intent to engage in clandestine laboratory on the ground that Reed did not constructively possess 
the alleged illegal items. Although Reed lived a home where controlled substance precursors and 
laboratory equipment were found, the magistrate and court of appeals noted that other persons 
also lived in the Reed home. The room containing the laboratory equipment was rented to 
another person, there was no evidence that Reed had control over the room and its contents, there 
were no controlled substances or precursors found among Reed's personal belongings, and Reed 
made no incriminating statements. 
Mr. Fixmer argued that his connection to the alleged clandestine laboratory materials was 
even more attenuated than in Reed. Unlike Reed, the police here discovered neither laboratory 
materials nor precursor chemicals in the home. Moreover, no drugs of any kind were found in the 
unidentified substances. 
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home. Instead, the alleged laboratory components were found some distance from the home 
secreted inside coolers tied to the back of four-wheelers. Those four-wheelers or OHV's were 
driven by people largely unknown to Mr. Fixmer. Moreover, Mr. Fixmer made no incriminating 
statements linking him to the laboratory components.6 Mr. Fixmer simply told police that he 
believed that Karl Hoppe and John McLaughlin were storing camping equipment in the garage.7 
These statements are insufficient to establish that Mr. Fixmer constructively possessed laboratory 
materials. 
In summary Mr. Fixmer contended, and the magistrate agreed, that Reed and other Utah 
appellate court precedents explained below, supported the court's order dismissing the charges 
against Mr. Fixmer. Those additional cases mandate dismissal whenever the state fails to establish 
a possessory link or nexus between the accused and the illegal item. See State v. Layman, 985 
P.2d 911 (Utah 1999) ("it is necessary that there be a sufficient nexus between the accused and 
the drug to permit an inference that the accused had both the power and the intent to exercise 
dominion and control over the drug."); State v. Solas, 820 P.2d 1386 (Utah App. 1991) ("the 
mere presence of the defendant in a [location where] illicit drugs are found does not, without 
more, constitute sufficient proof of his possession of such drugs.); State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 
6
 Arguably, the only incriminating statements were made by the home's other occupant, 
Page Guertzgen. Guertzgen told police that the search items would be located in the garage. 
Like in Reed, another occupant's knowledge and incriminating statements are insufficient to 
establish guilt of a third party. See also State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985) 
("Ownership and/or occupancy of the premises upon which the drugs are found, although 
important factors, are not alone sufficient to establish constructive possession, especially when 
occupancy is not exclusive.") 
7
 The police processed fingerprints from the laboratory components. No fingerprints 
matched Mr. Fixmer. The only matched fingerprints belonged to John McLaughlan. 
5 
319 (Utah 1985) ("persons who might know of the whereabouts of illicit drugs and who might 
even have access to them, but who have no intent to obtain and use the drugs can not be 
convicted of possession of a controlled substance."). 
L THE COURT SHOULD ORDER FULL BRIEFING IN THIS MATTER TO 
DECIDE THE APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE OF CONSTRUCTIVE 
POSSESSION PRECEDENT AT PRELIMINARY HEARINGS. 
In factual scenarios similar to this case, both this court and the court of appeals, have 
repeatedly reversed convictions finding that an accused did not constructively possess drugs, 
paraphernalia, or laboratory materials. See Reed, Slip op. at 2. In ignoring this established 
precedent, the state argues that "the magistrate's refusal to bind over on the meth lab charges . . . 
amounts to a refusal to draw any prosecution favorable inferences . . . . Motion for Summary 
Reversal, 8. The state contends that two prosecution favorable inferences can be drawn from the 
evidence: (1) that Mr. Fixmer "had been duped into storing volatile meth (sic) lab equipment and 
supplies in his garage; or (2) that Mr. Fixmer knew that meth (sic) lab materials were stored in the 
garage. 
In either instance, the state has failed to suflBcient evidence to support a bind over. See 
State v. Clark, 20 P.2d 300, 303 (Utah 2001) (State must present "suflBcient evidence to establish 
that the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it."). If Mr. 
Fixmer was duped into storing laboratory equipment in his garage, then "viewing [the] evidence in 
the light most favorable to the prosecution and draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
prosecution," Clark, 20 P.3d at 303, the state has failed to prove that Mr. Fixmer committed a 
crime. Under this scenario Mr. Fixmer lacks any knowledge that illegal items are stored in his 
garage. There can be no crime under any standard of review if an accused does not know that 
6 
illegal items are stored in his home 
Similarly, even assuming that Mr Fixmer "knew precisely what was in the garage/meth lab 
and in the stolen ATV's ," as argued by the state, they have still failed to establish probable 
cause to support a bind over Clark, 20 P 3d at 303 (The magistrate's role in this matter, while 
limited, is not that of a rubber stamp for the prosecution Even with this limited role, the 
magistrate must attempt to ensure that all 'groundless and improvident prosecutions' are ferreted 
out no later than the preliminary hearing ") Knowledge of the presence of illegal substances in 
the home, without more, is insufficient to show that crime has been committed Set Fox, 709 
P 2d at 319 ("Knowledge and ability to possess do not equal possession where there is no 
evidence of intent to make use of that knowledge and ability "). The best evidence presented by 
the state shows that Mr Fixmer may have known that illegal items were stored in his garage 
This is insufficient to show that Mr Fixmer committed a crime 
Moreover, Mr Fixmer5 s proximity to Kelson, McLaughlan, and Hoppe is an insufficient 
basis upon which to conclude that he committed a drug crime See State v. Munsen, 821 P 2d 13, 
15 (Utah App \99\)(quoting Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U S 85, 91 (1979)) ("A 'person's mere 
propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give 
rise to probable cause to search that person "),8 see also Brown v. Texas, 443 U S 47, 51-52 
(1979) (mere presence in a neighborhood frequented by drug users does not give rise to 
reasonable suspicion to stop and detain) 
8
 The state's argument that Mr Fixmer's presence in the company of others suspected of 
crime should not be a factor in deciding whether he committed a crime 
7 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Fixmer's case is factually and legally different than the Hoppe and Kelson cases. This 
court should deny the state's motion for summary reversal and reinstate the briefing schedule in 
this case. The magistrate in this case followed existing Utah appellate court precedent in refusing 
to bind over Mr. Fixmer. Accordingly, Mr. Fixmer objects to the state's motion for summary 
reversal and asks that this matter proceed in the normal course of the appellate process. 
DATED this jO day of September, 2001. 
RICHARD P. MAURO 
Attorney for Appellee Mark Fixmer 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing TO MOTION TO STAY UTAH SUPREME 
COURT'S DISPOSITION OF PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI IN COMPANION 
CASES was mailed, postage pre-paid, to the following , this /O day of September, 2001 
Assistant Attorney General Marian Decker 
160 East 300 South 6th Floor 
P O Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
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ADDENDUM 
44 C" 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Mark Fixmer, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
, MLLD 
Utah Court of Appeals 
OCT 0 1 2001 
PaulettB Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
ORDER DENYING 
SUMMARY REVERSAL 
Case No. 20010241-CA 
This matter is before the court on a motion for summary 
reversal based on the Utah Supreme Court1s order in the companion 
cases, State v. Hoppe (20010523-SC) and State v. Kelsen 
(20010524-SC) wherein the Supreme Court ordered remand to this 
court with instructions to reverse the magistrate's order 
quashing the bind-over and requiring the magistrate to bind-over 
both defendants on the first degree felony charges. However, we 
have concluded the case before this court is factually 
distinguishable from the companion cases and summary reversal is 
not appropriate in this case. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for summary reversal is 
denied and a ruling on the issues raised therin is deferred 
pending the plenary presentation and consideration of the appeal. 
Appellant's brief is to be filed with this court no later than 
November 13, 2001. 
Dated this / day of CcptGrnbor, 2001. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
ADDENDUM 
Utah Case Law 
STATE v. REED, 2000 UT App 258, P. 3d 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Jeff Claude REED, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 990973-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
September 8, 2000. 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Appeal from the Third District, Salt Lake Department, The Honorable 
William Barrett. 
Jan Graham and Karen A. Klucznik, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges BENCH, DAVIS, and THORNE. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
BENCH, Judge: 
The State argues that because actual involvement m a zlai fcst_ t__ 
_latr_ is not an element of the offense charged, it was not required 
to establish an actual physical connection between defendant and 
the _1^>. located in his residence. Although we agree that showing a 
physical connection between defendant and an operating laboratory 
is not required, the statute does require the State to establish 
that defendant, intending to "engage in a iLldii^:tme> laboratory 
operation," actually possessed the controlled substance precursor, 
or laboratory equipment, or supplies. Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37d-4(1)(a) & (b) (1998) (providing it is unlawful to knowingly 
or intentionally "possess" such items "with the intent to engage 
m a j^lana~^-a.ic-_ laboratory operation") . Further, in order to 
prove constructive possession, "it is necessary that there [be] a 
sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug [or 
paraphernalia] to permit an inference that the accused had both 
the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the 
drug [or paraphernalia].'" State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 13, 
Qft5 P 2d 311 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Fox, 
nQ^ P 2d ilC, 319 (Utah 1985)). In determining whether there is 
constructive possession, we may "consider[] factors that were 
considered relevant by an appellate court analyzing a 
factually-similar context." Id. at f 15. 
In this case, the evidence demonstrated that defendant lived in 
the house for approximately three weeks before the controlled 
substance precursors and laboratory equipment were found. Alone, 
this is not enough to establish constructive possession See Fox, 
709 P 2d at 319 (stating "[o]wnership and/or occupancy of the 
premises upon which the drugs are found, although important 
jr age Z O I Z 
factors, are not alone sufficient to establish constructive 
possession, especially when occupancy is not exclusive"). The room 
containing the laboratory was rented to someone other than 
defendant, and there was no evidence indicating that defendant had 
any control over the room or its contents. See id. (providing one 
factor of constructive possession may be "presence of drugs in a 
specific area over which the accused had control"). No controlled 
substance precursors or laboratory equipment were found among 
defendant's personal effects, see id. (providing another factor of 
constructive possession may be "presence of drug paraphernalia 
among the accused's personal effects or in a place over which the 
accused has special control"), and defendant made no incriminating 
statements connecting him to the laboratory found in the house. 
See id. Simply put, the evidence does not ""permit an inference 
that [defendant] had both the power and the intent to exercise 
dominion and control1" over the contraband found in the downstairs 
bedroom. Layman, 1999 UT 79 at f 13 (quoting Fox. 709 P.2d at 
319). Therefore, because the State did not "produce enough 
evidence sufficient to survive a motion for a directed verdict 
with respect to each element of the crime, " the trial court 
properly quashed the bmdover. State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 438 
(Utah 1998). 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge, and WILLIAM A. THORNE, JR., Judge. 
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